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Chapter 1
Introduction
 
Current advanced commercial transport aircraft, such as the Boeing B777/B747-400, the
Airbus A320/A340 and the McDonnell Douglas MD-11, rely on AutoFlight Systems (AFS) for
flight management, navigation and inner loop control.  These systems have evolved from
straightforward autopilots into multiple computers capable of sophisticated and interrelated
tasks.  These tasks span the range from high level flight management to low level inner loop
control.  In addition, these systems provide envelope protection to prevent pilots from committing
mistakes such as stalling the aircraft or lowering flaps at high speeds.
Unfortunately, as these systems have become more complex and interconnected, a new class
of problems has developed associated with pilots’ interaction with the automation.  Many
incidents have been reported where there exists some confusion between the pilots’ expectations
of the AFS and what the system is actually doing (Corwin, 1995).  This confusion has been
termed a Mode Awareness Problem (MAP).
After a description of the AFS, a formal definition of mode awareness problems is presented
in Section 1.3 followed by representative incidents in which mode awareness problems are
suspected as being a contributory factor.  
 
1.1 AutoFlight System Description
 
The AFS in modern aircraft has three distinct mechanisms which correspond loosely to the
time constants associated with the differing types of control.  At the lowest level are a set of inner
loop controllers, especially in Fly By Wire (FBW) systems, which improve the handling
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characteristics of the aircraft by modifying the dynamics to which the pilot is exposed and provide
aircraft attitude control.  Above these are a set of autopilots (A/P) which command the aircraft to
a specific state by providing inputs to the lower level controllers, much as a pilot would do
manually.  Finally, the Flight Management Computer (FMC) is a high level planning tool which
can be programmed by the pilot to fly a complex predefined trajectory.  These levels are discussed
in more detail below.
 
1.1.1
 
Fly By Wire and Inner Loop Controllers
Inner loop controllers fly the aircraft to a target flight attitude.  For example, if an external
disturbance caused an aircraft to roll, the controller would return the aircraft to a level state, but
would not correct for the integrated effects of the roll, such as a change in heading, or a loss of
altitude.  In a similar manner, the controller which maintains the aircraft pitch would compensate
for a disturbance causing the pitch to change, but would not return the aircraft to the commanded
altitude.
In addition, these controllers also perform a secondary role in Fly By Wire (FBW) aircraft,
such as the Airbus A320/A340.  Even the most basic flight control devices, such as the yoke (or
side stick), pedals and throttle do not provide raw inputs directly to the control surfaces in FBW
aircraft.  Instead, the inputs are filtered and modified in a manner designed to provide a consistent
set of dynamics to the pilot.  This is intended to improve the safety of the aircraft by providing
consistent responses to pilot inputs (Fishbein, 1995).
Even in aircraft which are not FBW, a set of low level inner loop systems may exist to control
certain aircraft modes.  The most well known of these is the yaw damper that is used on
commercial jet transports (Weiner, 1988).  Other aircraft have systems which modify input from
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the standard control mechanisms to allow more flexibility in flight.  For example, Control Wheel
Steering (CWS) is available in the MD-11 and allows the pilot to directly control the roll angle of
the aircraft.
 
1.1.2
 
Simple Autopilots
Simple autopilots control the aircraft at a level higher than the low level controllers by
allowing the pilot to command the aircraft into a specific target state, such as holding at a
commanded altitude, heading, or speed, or descending at a commanded rate.  The autopilot
system controls the aircraft around the commanded input of the pilot by providing inputs to the
low level controllers to fly the aircraft to the designated path and speed (Fishbein, 1995).
In most cases, the A/P is also minimally capable of switching targets, and switching which
specific A/P is currently controlling the aircraft.  This capability allows the automation to make
simple transitions to fly individual legs of segmented trajectory.  For example, a system designed
to control around a vertical speed may also include the logic necessary to stop the descent at a
commanded altitude.  When the aircraft levels out, a different A/P mechanism would control the
aircraft to maintain that altitude.
The input to the autopilot is usually a Mode Control Panel (MCP), also referred to as a Flight
Control Unit (FCU), which provides mechanisms to dial in various aircraft targets (altitude,
vertical speed, airspeed, heading, etc.).  The pilot then explicitly engages the A/P to capture the
target.  Limiting the complexity and capability of the autopilot system is the fact that only one
target is associated with an individual autopilot system.
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1.1.3
 
Flight Management System
The FMS is the strategic interface to the aircraft which drives the set of low level
autopilots.  The FMS has onboard an extensive database of navigation aids, waypoints, and
standard arrival and departure procedures.  Pilots use the FMS with a flight plan route to drive the
set of low level autopilots.  Pilots program the flight plan, consisting of waypoints and constraints
into the FMS by interacting through a keypad-based Control and Display Unit (CDU).  Using the
flight plan, inputs from multiple navigation receivers and the database, the FMS provides inputs
to the low level autopilots to flight the route automatically (Curran, 1992).  The FMS can
determine the most economical climb profiles, cruise altitudes, speeds and descent points to meet
economic and wind constraints.
At a conceptual level, the FMS functions by switching between different vertical and lateral
autopilot modes during different phases of flight without any need for further intervention from
the pilot.  This is particularly useful in long, uneventful stages of flight, such as cruise, though the
FMS in modern aircraft is capable of fully automatic flights, including autonomous landings.
 
1.2 AutoFlight System Architectural Overview
 
Intrinsically, the higher level AutoFlight System function consists of switching between
different 
 
modes
 
 of aircraft automation with simple modes being strung together to create more
complicated flight trajectories.  The following sections begin with an overview of mode
definitions and the various types of mode transitions.  Next, differences between horizontal and
vertical modes are examined in the context of currently available mode feedback
mechanisms.  Finally the basic types of AFS input-output relationships are discussed.
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1.2.1
 
Mode Definition
In this context, a mode is defined as a state of the aircraft automation which has a particular
set of target criteria, control characteristics and transition criteria.  Target criteria are the values
that are programmed by the pilot or by the automation to which the mode will control the
aircraft.  An example would be the target heading or altitude at which the aircraft is flown.  
The control characteristics define the actuators and associated control laws that the
automation will use to fly to the target criteria.  An example is using the ailerons to control the roll
angle of the aircraft to acquire and maintain a commanded heading.
Transition criteria define the situations in which the automation will switch from the active
mode to a new mode.  These criteria can be utilized to create complex flight trajectories.  An
example of a transition criterium is the commanded altitude when the aircraft is in a descending
mode.  When the aircraft reaches the commanded altitude the automation will switch the active
mode from the one used for the descent to a mode that transitions smoothly to and maintains the
commanded altitude.  Another example is if the aircraft exceeded safety limits, the automation
will switch the active mode to one which reduced the risk of exceeding those limits.
 
1.2.2
 
Types of Modes
Current AutoFlight Systems switch between two basic types of operating modes which have
been termed base modes and macro modes.
 
Base Modes
 
Base modes are used in quasi-steady-state conditions and have an invariant set of targets.  A
base mode example would be a Vertical Speed mode where the aircraft attempts to maintain a
specific vertical speed target by controlling pitch using the elevators and an airspeed by
controlling the thrust.
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Macro Modes
 
Macro modes consist of a linked sequence of base modes.  Each base mode in the macro
mode sequence has its own set of targets, implying a set of targets which vary over the course of
the macro mode.  Transitions between the base modes are made based on the mode transition
criteria, such as altitude or indicated air speed.  An example of a macro mode is the Autoland
sequence, which transitions (in the vertical channel) between Altitude Hold, Glide Slope Capture,
Flare, and Rollout with a different set of targets in each base mode.
 
1.2.3
 
Mode Transitions
There are three types of transitions between modes.  A 
 
commanded transition
 
 is active as
soon as the selection is made.  An example is pressing the Vertical Speed button, and thereby
activating the Vertical Speed mode.  An 
 
uncommanded transition
 
 is one that is not directly
activated by the pilot.  These transitions are usually some type of envelope protection.  An
example is a transition caused by overspeed protection.  Finally, 
 
automatic/conditional
transitions
 
 occur when, after arming, a mode engagement occurs at a transition criterium.  An
example is the use of Glide Slope Capture to transition to a descent mode after the aircraft
intersects with the ILS glide slope signal.
 
1.2.4
 
Horizontal and Vertical Modes
The AFS in a modern aircraft typically separates the guidance into uncoupled horizontal and
vertical components.  A simple example of a horizontal guidance base mode is using the MCP to
command the aircraft to acquire and maintain a selected heading or track.  A more complicated
macro mode would be to use the CDU to program the FMS to fly a segmented trajectory in
Lateral Navigation (LNAV).  In this mode, the aircraft flies between preprogrammed waypoints
defined by terrestrial navigation aids.
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Typical vertical guidance modes include using the MCP to fly level in an Altitude Hold mode,
or maintaining a selected vertical speed with Vertical Speed mode.  In each of these modes the
aircraft is controlled to a vertical path and the commanded airspeed.  The FMS is also capable of
flying complex Vertical Navigation (VNAV) trajectories, programmed by the pilot through the
CDU, however, this mode is limited in use as LNAV mode must also be engaged.  This is required
because VNAV mode consists of adding altitude and speed restrictions to the horizontal
waypoints.  These restrictions would not have any context without the horizontal references.
 
1.2.5
 
Mode Feedback
The Flight Mode Annunciator on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) of modern aircraft is
normally the primary location of mode status information.  FMAs typically display the current
mode configuration of the aircraft in a text format.  The mode configuration consists of both the
active mode and any additional modes that may have been armed, such as glide slope or localizer
capture modes.  
Figure 1.1: Primary Flight Display and Flight Mode Annunciator on B747-400
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Both a PFD and a FMA from the Boeing B747-400 are shown below in Figure 1.1.  As can be
seen, the FMA is located in the middle of the display directly above the artificial horizon.  The
FMA symbology shows that the aircraft’s Auto Throttle (A/T) mechanism is engaged and is being
controlled by the autopilot (CMD) to follow a speed (SPD).  In addition, the aircraft is in Lateral
Navigation mode (LNAV) and currently holding altitude (ALT HLD) at 5000 ft.
 
1.2.6
 
AFS Input-Output Relationships
Two basic types of AFS input-output relationships can exist.  The simpler is a quasi-steady-
state model where each output state is controlled by a single input:  Single Input-Single Output
(SISO).  A typical Vertical Speed mode engages two independent SISO controllers:  the aircraft’s
pitch controls the vertical speed and the thrust controls the air speed.  SISO models appear to be
functionally adequate for most base modes.
The second type of relationship is one utilizing a Multiple Input-Multiple Output (MIMO)
controller, where each output variable is controlled by more than one input.  Some mode
transitions appear to utilize a MIMO relationship.  These transitions are typically of short
duration and they do not appear to be modelled in detail by flight crews.  An example of a
complex mode transition is the 0.05g capture used in an Altitude Capture transition of the MD-
11:  when the aircraft is approaching a selected flight altitude, the intercept maneuver limits the
normal acceleration to 0.05g.
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1.3 Mode Awareness Problems
 
A mode awareness problem exists when there is confusion between the pilots’ expectations of
the AFS and what the system is actually doing.  Previous research (Sarter and Woods, 1992) has
categorized mode awareness problems based on their underlying themes, such as problems related
to VNAV modes, data entry, uncommanded mode transitions, infrequently used modes and
features of the AFS etc.
In this work, mode awareness problems will be categorized in a less specific manner into three
classically defined error categories:  commission, omission and incorrect action (Sheridan,
1992).  These are errors as viewed from the standpoint of the pilot:  when the pilot believes that
the AFS has committed an error.  This allows a broader categorization, independent of the specific
AFS mechanisms in question and instead focussing on the generic cause of mode confusion.  In
this research, mode awareness problems are said to have occurred when the aircraft AutoFlight
System
1. executes an unexpected action - commission
2. fails to execute an expected action - omission
3. executes an action in an unexpected way - incorrect action
The next section will provide descriptions of three incidents which are examples of the types
of mode awareness problems in this categorization.
 
1.3.1
 
Incidents Suspected to have Involved Mode Awareness Problems
A few specific incidents are described below in order to give examples of actual cases of
mode awareness problems.  The first example is an error of commission:  an A300 at Nagoya was
inadvertently put into a go-around mode (Mecham, 1994) resulting in the crew fighting the
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unexpected result.  The second example illustrates an error of omission when an A320 in
Bangalore was set in an incorrect mode (Lenorovitz, 1990) during approach that caused it to fail
to add power to maintain a sufficient airspeed.  The final example is one of an incorrect
action.  Vertical path control confusion on an Airbus A320 at Strausbourg (Sparaco, 1994) caused
a Controlled Flight into Terrain as the crew was unable to detect an incorrect mode selection.
 
Commission:  Pitch Control in Go Around
 
On April 26, 1994, an Airbus A300 landing at Nagoya Airport was inadvertently put into Go
Around (G/A) mode by the pilots.  G/A mode is used in situations where a landing needs to be
aborted, and the aircraft needs to be reconfigured to leave the runway airspace and gain altitude
quickly in order to attempt another landing.  The mode attempts to pitch the aircraft into a nose up
attitude and add power in order to climb.
The inadvertent engaging of G/A mode led to the crew using the aircraft flight controls to fight
the automation in an attempt to keep the aircraft in a descent for landing.  The aircraft’s horizontal
stabilizer was being trimmed for a nose up attitude as the automation attempted to overcome the
pilots’ using the elevators to place the aircraft into a descent configuration.  When the pilots
finally decided to abort the landing and to perform a G/A maneuver, they reconfigured the
elevators for a climb configuration, which, when combined with the trim state of the horizontal
stabilizer, caused the aircraft to pitch up sharply, stall at low altitude and crash (Mecham, 1994).
 
Omission:  Incorrect Mode Selection
 
In February of 1990, an A320 crashed in Bagalore.  The incident is suspected to have been
caused by the crew incorrectly setting the descent mode during the approach.  The A320 has an
“idle open descent” mode in which the autothrust system keeps the engines at idle power.  This
mode is designed to be used for fuel efficient descents from altitude.  However, since, in this
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mode, the autothrust system limits the throttle to idle power, the mode does not allow the aircraft
to necessarily maintain a commanded speed.  In most high altitude descents, the pitch of the
aircraft is used to maintain the commanded airspeed.
On this flight, an inexperienced first officer was flying the landing with the captain observing 
performance.  According to the accident investigation, the crew entered the final approach phase
of flight in a Vertical Speed mode (a “speed protected mode” which maintains the commanded
speed) but then switched to the “idle open descent” mode (which does not maintain the
commanded speed).  The crew commented on the mode of the aircraft, and discussed how to
disengage it, but did not actually do so.  Neither crew member appeared to be monitoring the
speed of the aircraft as it slowed to 25 kts below the 132 kts approach speed.  It is speculated that
the crew expected the AFS to automatically add power to the aircraft as it would do in a speed
protected mode, such as the Vertical Speed mode normally used during approach.
This particular incident could be viewed as an error of omission.  The crew expected that the
aircraft was controlling the airspeed and relied on throttles to add power.  The active mode of the
aircraft did not allow this to occur.
 
Incorrect Action:  Vertical Path Confusion
 
On January 20, 1992, an A320 aircraft crashed during a non-precision approach into
Strausbourg airport.  The aircraft was estimated to be descending at 3300 fpm, a much steeper
rate than the approach was designed for.  The approach to the airport specifies a gradual step-
down with numerous level-off altitudes and short descent legs.  Many pilots who land at
Strausbourg realized that this complex approach trajectory could be safely approximated with a
flight path angle of 3.3
 
°
 
.  This descent rate came sufficiently close to matching the multiple
altitude waypoints on the descent profile detailed in the approach plate.
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It is speculated that the flight crew’s intent was to descend on this simplified path, but instead
placed the aircraft into the wrong descent mode:  Vertical Speed instead of Flight Path Angle.  In
Vertical Speed mode, the indication for 3300 fpm looks almost identical to a descent in Flight
Path Angle mode of 3.3
 
°. T
 
he only indication of the engagement of an incorrect mode was text on
the Flight Mode Annunciator and a decimal point on the target display.  At the ground speed of
the aircraft, 3300 fpm was twice the intended descent rate.  The crew did not recognize the
problem until too late and the much higher descent rate resulted in a Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(CFIT).
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Chapter 2
Background and Motivating Research
 
The fundamental motivation for this research is to reduce the number of aircraft incidents
related to mode awareness problems.  Toward this end, incidents in which mode awareness issues
are suspected to have been a contributing factor have been examined.  A review of the reports
contained within the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database was conducted along
with a set of focussed interviews with flight crews and an examination of the feedback
mechanisms in modern AutoFlight Systems.
 
2.1 Aviation Safety Reporting System
 
The Aviation Safety Reporting System allows pilots to detail safety problems or incidents
with a degree of amnesty.  A search was performed on the ASRS database by researchers at the
Aeronautical Systems Laboratory (Vaneck and Midkiff, 1994) from the years 1990-94 with a set
of keywords designed to elicit problems related to mode awareness.  The keywords consisted of
the following:  annunciation, annunciator, FMC, flight management computer, FMS, flight
management system, CDU, mode, capture, arm, automatic flight system, vertical, horizontal, and
program.
A total of three hundred ASRS reports were returned by the keyword search.  After analysis,
184 were categorized as mode awareness problems using the definition in Section 1.3.
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As shown in Figure 2.1, these reports were then categorized by the perceived cause of the
problem and by the flight path (vertical/speed, horizontal or both) that was impacted.  Since the
vertical flight path and the speed are implicitly coupled, problems with either were grouped
together.  In instances where the problems spanned multiple causal categories, the reports were
counted in each relevant category.
In Figure 2.1, it can be seen that vertical/speed problems dominate many of the categories.  A
total of 62.7% of the reports were vertical/speed related.  In particular, the Mode Transition
Problems category is dominated by vertical/speed problems.  The data classified into the
Insufficient Understanding of Automation also suggests a deficiency in knowledge of the vertical
domain automation.
 
‘
Figure 2.1: Breakdown of ASRS reports into Perceived Causes and Flight Domain
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It should be noted that there exists a potential for over-reporting vertical deviations.  Since Air
Traffic Control (ATC) radar has very precise surveillance of altitude versus position, there may be
more cause to report vertical/speed incidents due to the amnesty clause in the ASRS.
 
2.2 Feedback Mechanisms in Current AutoFlight Systems
 
Feedback mechanisms in current aircraft AutoFlight Systems were examined to determine
whether the feedback available concerning the active mode and the characteristics of that mode
was sufficient (Midkiff, 1994).  In addition the underlying aircraft automation architecture was
examined to see whether it was a contributing factor in mode awareness issues.  The aircraft
examined included the Boeing B757/B767, the McDonnell Douglass MD-11 and the Airbus
A300-600R.  
An inventory of Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA) schemes was also completed by reviewing
training manuals and a review of the open literature.  The intent was to examine the feedback
available on the Primary Flight Display through the FMA - the primary source of feedback for the
automation state.  The display conventions used in the FMA were compared across a larger set of
aircraft, including the Boeing B737-500/600, B757, and B767, McDonnell Douglass MD-11,
MD-80, Fokker 100 and Airbus A300-600R.
 
2.2.1
 
Flight Mode Annunciators
As detailed in Section 1.2.5, the Flight Mode Annunciator on the Primary Flight Display of
modern aircraft is used as the primary indicator of mode status information.  Most FMAs depict
the current mode configuration of the aircraft in text along with any armed modes.
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More recently designed FMAs include target states along with the name of the mode.  An
example of a target state value would be the value of the commanded vertical speed in Vertical
Speed mode.  The Fokker F100 and the MD-11 FMAs also display the control allocation in each
mode.  This information identifies which actuator is controlling a particular output.  Knowledge
of control allocation
 
 
 
is particularly important in the vertical domain, since pitch and thrust can be
used interchangeably to control the vertical path and speed.  Note that the availability of control
allocation
 
 
 
in these FMAs implies a set of parallel SISO (Single Input, Single Output) controllers
being used.  Neither of these features appears on the Boeing B747-400 FMA example shown in
Section 1.1. 
 
2.2.2
 
Horizontal Channel Feedback
The primary feedback display for the horizontal channel is the Electronic Horizontal Situation
Indicator (Map or Navigation Display) (EHSI) shown in Figure 2.2, which gives a full tactical
and strategic view of the current and planned path of the aircraft.  The position of the aircraft is
Figure 2.2: Electronic Horizontal Situation Display
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shown by a white triangle in the bottom center of the display.  The aircraft is shown
geographically relative to the inactive (blue) and programmed (magenta) waypoints in the
vicinity.  Programmed waypoints are those which have been entered as endpoints in segments of
the FMS path (magenta line).  The next active waypoint, the one that is actively being flown to, is
shown in white.  The current aircraft heading is shown on the compass arc on the top of the
display.  The second frame shows the same scene a few minutes later, after the descent to LAPEL
has begun.
By displaying the area in front of the aircraft, this display allows pilots to quickly ascertain
how the aircraft has been programmed and anticipate what it is expected to do.  In particular, any
deviation from the programmed path can quickly be seen by the aircraft symbol flying away from
the magnenta line.
Figure 2.3: Primary Flight Display
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2.2.3
 
Vertical Channel Feedback
The primary source of vertical channel feedback is the textual display in the Flight Mode
Annunciator, in the top middle of the PFD shown in Figure 2.2.  In this figure, the aircraft is
tracking the ILS glide slope.  To the right of the Attitude Determination Indicator, the magenta
diamond shows the aircraft deviation above or below the glide slope, indicating, in addition to
textually, that the current mode is Glide Slope Tracking.  To the right of the altitude tape, the
vertical path indicator shows the current descent rate of the aircraft, independent of active mode.
A few graphical elements related to the vertical path are displayed also on the EHSI.  The first
frame in Figure 2.2 shows a Top of Descent pseudowaypoint about 3 nmi in front of the
aircraft.  During the descent, an Altitude Intercept Arc (as seen in the second frame) indicates
where the aircraft is expected to reach its commanded altitude.  The programmed VNAV path is
implied by the Top of Descent point, but this actual path is only displayed as a series of text based
altitude and speed restrictions on the CDU.  Pilots can use the keypad on the CDU to flip through
pages of flight segments with associated restrictions and build a mental picture of the aircraft
flight path.  Unfortunately, in total, the various feedback mechanisms available for the vertical
channel do not provide immediate graphical feedback.
 
2.2.4
 
Feedback Mechanism versus Channel Complexity
There is also an discrepancy between the feedback available in the vertical channel and the
horizontal channel.  Though the vertical channel is functionally more complex, there is less
feedback to the pilots than in the horizontal.  The vertical channel is more complex than the
horizontal channel for two reasons:  multiple targets and multiple control mechanisms for those
targets.  
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As shown in Table 2.4, the horizontal flight of an aircraft is limited to using a single method to
control a single target state:  controlling the heading of the aircraft by using the ailerons to for roll
authority.
In contrast, the vertical flight of an aircraft requires control of both the speed of the aircraft
and its vertical path, since speed and vertical path are interrelated.  This leads to the vertical flight
of an aircraft having many more potential target states:  vertical speed, altitude, preprogrammed
vertical flight paths, airspeed, thrust level, aircraft pitch, angle of attack and so on.  In addition,
each of these targets can be controlled to by a combination of the aircraft pitch and the thrust
level.  Table 2.5 shows a tally of vertical and speed based flight modes drawn from the MD-11
Cockpit Pilot’s Guide.
As an example, in a simple base mode, such as the Altitude Hold mode, the aircraft speed
would be controlled by the throttle and the vertical path (in this case, the altitude) would be
controlled by the pitch of the aircraft with the elevators.  Another base mode, Flight Level Change
mode, sets the throttle at a limit value to control the vertical climb rate, and controls the speed of
the aircraft with the pitch.
 
Table 2.4: Representative Horizontal Modes in the MD-11
Horizontal Modes Control Allocation
 
Heading Roll
Track Roll
NAV Roll
ILS Localizer Tracking Roll
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2.3 Focussed Interviews
 
Information was gathered via focussed interviews from a variety of informal sources,
including direct flight deck observations, discussions with flight crews, and discussions with
simulator check airmen about their observations of crews during recurrent training.
Two major conclusions were drawn from these interviews.  The first was that the lack of a
simple model for the AutoFlight System prompts pilots to create their own ad hoc models.  The
second was that the vertical channel poses many more problems than the horizontal channel, due
to lack of feedback and its greater complexity.
 
Table 2.5: Representative Vertical and Speed Modes in the MD-11
Vertical and Speed Modes Speed Control Allocation Path Control Allocation
 
Altitude Hold  Throttle Elevator
Altitude Capture Mixed
(MIMO transition)
FMS Altitude Hold Throttle Elevator
FMS Profile Descent Elevator IDLE Throttle
Vertical Speed (MCP) Throttle Elevator
Vertical Speed (FMS) Throttle Elevator
Flight Path Angle Throttle Elevator
Flight Level Change Elevator IDLE or CLIMB Throttle
Glide Slope Tracking Throttle Elevator
Flare Throttle Elevator
Go Around Elevator CLIMB Throttle
Low Speed Protection Elevator Throttle
High Speed Protection Elevator Throttle
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Based on the analysis of the structure of current AutoFlight Systems, there do not appear to be
any simple, consistent, global models for any current AFSs.  Such models are not available in
flight manuals which instead focus on crew interface and procedures.  In the absence of a simple
consistent model, pilots appear to develop their own ad hoc models of the AFS as independent
parallel SISO control loops.  As such, these models may not accurately represent AFS operation,
especially in transitions between modes, particularly during automatic transitions.  Transitions to
and from envelope protection modes also appear to be particularly troublesome.
Since the vertical channel is intrinsically more complex than the horizontal channel, the
problems associated with pilot models become exacerbated.  In addition since the vertical flight
path can be controlled by both pitch and thrust and is linked with the speed of the aircraft, many
of the transitions used by in vertical flight involve MIMO control techniques.  Pilots do not
appear to model MIMO transitions in detail, relying instead on an understanding of the final target
state and some smoothness criteria to monitor the AFS performance.  
 
2.4 Improvement of Vertical Channel Feedback
 
The background research has identified the lack of feedback and a high degree of automation
complexity in the vertical channel as a possible source of mode awareness problems.  The ASRS
report analysis (Section 2.1) showed a majority of incident reports in the vertical/speed
mode.  The Flight Mode Annunciator (shown in Figure 1.1) depicts the minimal level of feedback
currently available for the vertical channel.  Finally, the focussed interviews with check airmen
(Section 2.3) highlight the complexity of the vertical flight channel.  Based on this information it
was hypothesized that adding feedback to the vertical channel would mitigate some of the
reported and suspected mode awareness problems.
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Chapter 3
Electronic Vertical Situation Display
 
Background research highlighted the vertical channel as an area in need of improved
feedback.  Based on this hypothesis, a set of crew information requirements was developed.  This
set of requirements was incorporated into an Electronic Vertical Situation Display (EVSD) to
mitigate some of the identified problems.
 
3.1 EVSD Design
 
The Electronic Vertical Situation Display is envisioned to provide an analog to the Electronic
Horizontal Situation Indicator, which is currently available in glass cockpits.  The display is
designed to show the programmed vertical path of the aircraft and the modes associated with that
path.
The information requirements for the EVSD were created based on operator requirements and
on known mode awareness problems.  The information requirements have four major
components:  the current mode, any anticipated modes, transitions into anticipated modes, and the
consequences of the current state of aircraft automation.  The four requirements also provide
answers to the most commonly asked questions asked in glass cockpits:  “What is it doing?”,
“Why did it do that?” and “What will it do next?” (Wiener, 1989).  These major aspects of the
EVSD are overviewed below, and presented in much greater detail in Section 3.2.
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3.1.1
 
Current Mode
The current mode of the automation needs to be identified along with any of the specific
attributes of the mode such as target state values and control allocation.  If possible these should
be displayed in a graphical format.
 
3.1.2
 
Anticipated Modes
Anticipated modes consist of the future modes into which the automation expects the aircraft 
to transition.  Based on some extrapolation of the current aircraft and automation state, the system
needs to be able to anticipate future mode transitions and the associated future modes.  This
determination may be straightforward for many preprogrammed macro modes, but it may be
inaccurate for uncommanded mode changes.  For example, the highly accurate prediction of
entering an envelope protection mode downstream is difficult.  Issues associated with anticipation
are discussed in Section 3.4.
 
3.1.3
 
Mode Transitions and Consequences
Anticipation of the consequences of the current state of the automation is necessary.  A
predictive profile based on the current automation state should display the locations of anticipated
mode transitions and their consequences on the flight path.  Determining the location of these
transitions requires making assumptions about both the intentions of the pilots and factors
external to the aircraft, such as weather and air temperature.  Closely related to this is the ability
to anticipate mode changes.  Since there may not be warning of certain types of mode changes,
especially those which are selected by the crew, this may not be possible in all situations.
The consequences of a mode change are based on an extrapolation of the current state of the
aircraft automation.  A predictive profile based on the current automation state is shown to
display the locations of anticipated mode transitions and their consequences on the flight path.
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3.2 EVSD Format
 
Figure 3.1 shows the prototype EVSD.  The display has four distinct areas.  At the top of the
display is the mode display window, showing the current and anticipated modes, control
allocations and target states.  At the left is a scalable altitude tape.  The bottom window can either
display the path distance (if in LNAV mode), or the range directly ahead of the aircraft.  Finally,
the main window shows the aircraft vertically in relation to the upcoming waypoints and mode
transition points.
Figure 3.1: EVSD during Vertical Speed Climb, reaching an envelope protection limit
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3.2.1
 
Current Mode
In Figure 3.1, the current mode is identified in the top window in green text, directly above the
aircraft symbol.  Underneath are the control allocations and the target states for the active
mode.  In this example, the aircraft is in Vertical Speed mode (V/S) with the vertical path
controlled by elevator (E) and the speed controlled by throttle (T).  An example of a transition
criterium is the dashed magenta line at 39 000 ft, which is the altitude dialed into the Mode
Control Panel.  
 
3.2.2
 
Anticipated Modes
On the EVSD, the anticipated mode is shown in the top window above the point where it is
predicted to be engaged.  The anticipated target state and control allocations are depicted in a
manner similar to the current mode.  In Figure 3.1, the system is predicting an envelope
protection violation and a mode transition to the Low Speed mode (LO SPD).  In this mode, the
display shows that the vertical path will be controlled by the throttles to Maximum Climb Thrust
(MCT), and the speed will be controlled by elevators to Vmin.  Note that both the target states and
the control allocation change when the new mode is engaged.  
Another mode change is anticipated once the aircraft reaches the MCP altitude of 39 000 ft,
approximately 40 nmi ahead of the aircraft.  The aircraft will switch to Altitude Hold mode
(HOLD).  Once the automation switches to this mode, the altitude becomes a target state, as
shown in the box underneath the HOLD text.
 
3.2.3
 
Mode Transitions and Consequences
Mode transition alerting has several elements.  The first is the text of the anticipated mode
translating across the top window, arriving at the current mode slot when engaged.  The second is
an Aircraft Path Line, commonly referred to as the “green line” which shows the path that the
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aircraft will travel based on the current state of the automation.  In Figure 3.1, the green line is
shown deviating from the solid magenta line as the automation anticipates the aircraft being
unable to maintain the commanded climb rate.  In this case, an elbow in the path also highlights
where the transition is calculated to occur.  
The green line also has a set of circles which highlight where the aircraft is going to undergo a
mode transition.  Green circles depict when the aircraft is going to undergo a programmed mode
transition, such as levelling at a commanded altitude as seen in Figure 3.1 near the 40 nmi
point.  These circles align with the green bars in front of programmed modes shown in the upper
window.  Yellow circles depict uncommanded or automatic mode changes that occur due to
envelope protection violations.  In Figure 3.1 the yellow circle at the bend of the elbow highlights
the transition at the 5 nmi point to the Low Speed mode (LO SPD).  These circles also align with
the yellow bars in front of automatic modes in the upper window.
 
3.2.4
 
Additional Symbology
A solid magenta line connecting waypoint crossing restrictions is a graphical display of the
current vertical path programmed into the FMS.  Shown in the main section of the EVSD screen
are the waypoints programmed into the FMS.  In a manner consistent with the EHSI, programmed
waypoints are magenta, and the active waypoint (the one the aircraft is flying to) is white.  Non-
programmed waypoints are not shown.
Altitude crossings are shown by the altitude of the waypoint symbol.  Waypoints without
restrictions are placed on the ground, or on the bottom edge of the screen if the ground is not
visible.  Dashed lines descend to the path scale on the bottom of the display to allow the distance
to future waypoints to be easily determined.  The horizontal scale is defined by the path distance
between each waypoint.
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The example shown in the Figure 3.2 is a Vertical Navigation macro mode (VNAV)
descent.  The aircraft is shown on the first segment of a descent profile using the VNAV mode to
maintain an altitude of 12 000 ft.  Near the TLG waypoint, the aircraft is anticipated to remain in
the VNAV macro mode, but to change the target state at the Top of Descent point (a transition
criterium) to a path-based descent.  The Aircraft Path Line highlights another mode change that
will occur near PQT at 10 000 ft as the aircraft intersects the preprogrammed MCP altitude
transition criterium and switches out of VNAV and into an Altitude Hold mode.
Figure 3.2: EVSD in VNAV Descent
Figure 3.3: EVSD Near Approach
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Figure 3.3 shows an aircraft close to approach with the additional symbology required near
landing.  The dashed white line is an indication of the location of the ILS glide slope.  At the end
of the glide slope is the runway, shown at the correct altitude and length.  The difference between
waypoints with and without an altitude restriction is also apparent.  WAXEN has an altitude
restriction associated with it, and is shown at that altitude of 3000 ft.  Since there is no altitude
restriction associated with the REVER waypoint, it is placed at ground level.
Finally, the very bottom of the main window in the Figure 3.2 has terrain information.  While
this capability was not used in the experimental evaluation, it has been prototyped on the EVSD.
 
3.3 EVSD Design Issues
 
There were several issues which were taken into account in the design of the EVSD.  The first
was that several assumptions had to be made about the underlying AFS that for which the EVSD
was providing feedback.  In a related manner, a set of consistent colour symbology had to be
selected.  Finally, the anticipation capability required for the depiction of future modes had to be
carefully designed.
 
3.3.1
 
Implementation Assumptions
Three major assumptions were made about the structure and capabilities of the underlying
automation.  The first was that the underlying architecture of the AFS was able to be represented
with a SISO model.  Earlier analysis has shown that the AFS appears to be functionally
representable by a SISO model for most operating conditions.  SISO models also appear to be
consistent with pilot models and are currently used on FMAs in some aircraft.
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The second assumption was that the system needed to maintain a level of consistency with the
current technology level.  In order to create a near term solution for current AFS problems, the
display was designed to be consistent with current display system limitations and
conventions.  This also allows pilots to be trained on this display with minimal effort, and with
maximum carryover from existing training.  This assumption also lead to a set of colour
conventions consistent with the Boeing B747-400 Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator as
shown in Table 3.2.  Note that the Aircraft Path Line is symbology that is not currently available
on the EHSI.  This symbology, described in detail in Section 3.2.3, was created in order to have a
mechanism to display anticipated mode changes, a capability not currently supported under
Boeing conventions.
In a related topic, in order to display anticipated modes, the ability to predict future
automation states based on the current flight vector and automation state was assumed.  This is
covered in more detail in Section 3.3.2.
 
Table 3.4: Color Conventions
Information Element Graphical Representation
 
MCP Input Dashed Magenta Line
FMS Path Magenta Line
Programmed Waypoint White Symbol
Current Waypoint Magenta Symbol
Mode Transition Point Green Circle
Uncommanded Mode Transition Point Yellow Circle
Aircraft Path Line Green Line
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3.3.2
 
Anticipation Issues
There are several issues to consider when implementing anticipatory capabilities into
aircraft.  The biggest concern with reliable anticipation is the varying nature of the flight
environment, both externally (winds, temperature) and internally (aircraft weight, configuration,
pilot input).
There are also concerns about the non-linearities of aircraft dynamics during mode changes
which may make the problem computationally difficult or not readily possible on current
generation AutoFlight Systems.  At the very least, aircraft may require better sensors, or better
noise filtering capabilities.  For this implementation of the EVSD, the specific anticipation
techniques used are detailed in Section 4.5.
It is important to realize that modern aircraft currently have some level of anticipation
capability.  Both the altitude capture arc and the flight time determination by FMS involve
estimates of the current and future state of the aircraft and provide pilots with input and
feedback.  Even with limitations, this input is found to be useful.  Pilots realize the limitations of
the automation (FMS calculates landings late, altitude capture arc moves) and adapt to them.  An
important consideration is that linear extrapolations improve as the aircraft approaches the
transition point.  These estimates improve primarily because environmental conditions are closer
to those at transition point and the likelihood of unanticipated conditions decreases.
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Chapter 4
Prototype EVSD Implementation
 
The prototype Electronic Vertical Situation Display was implemented on the Aeronautical
Systems Laboratory’s Advanced Part Task Simulator.  This chapter covers the capabilities of the
simulator facility and how they were used in this experiment.  The experiment involved using a
set of envelope protection features as part of a robust and realistic of AFS architecture.  The
chapter ends by covering the specifics of the mode anticipation implementation.
 
4.1 Part Task Simulator Facilities
 
The experiment was conducted at the MIT Aeronautical Systems Laboratory using the
Advanced Part Task Simulator.  This facility has been developed over the last seven years by
numerous MIT students involved in various aviation human factors and system design
experiments.
 
4.1.1
 
Simulator Setup
The heart of the simulator facility was a Silicon Graphics, Inc.  (SGI) Indigo
 
2
 
 Extreme
Workstation.  This machine is interfaced to a Mode Control Panel from a Boeing B737 cockpit, a
sidestick controller, a Control Display Unit, and a set of standard aircraft input levers - throttles,
landing gear, flaps and speed brakes.  A schematic of this setup is shown in Figure 4.1.
The Mode Control Panel was used by the pilot flying as the primary input to the aircraft.  The
sidestick controller was used by the subject to provide input to the sidetask (detailed in
Section 5.4.1).  The CDU was primarily used as a mechanism to display altitude restrictions that
had previously been programmed into the AutoFlight System.  This was important for
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experimental runs in which the EVSD was not available as a graphical depiction of this
information.  Finally, the flap lever on the center panel was used in a number of scenarios to
simulate low speed situations during approach scenarios.
 
4.1.2
 
Screen Layout and Display Geometry
As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the prototype EVSD was placed on the simulator screen directly
below the EHSI (map mode) display.  It was scaled to be as wide as the EHSI and approximately
half as tall.
Figure 4.1:  Prototype Part Task Simulator Facility
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A side task is located on the top left of the screen.  The side task consisted of centering the
position of a moving horizontal gray bar by using a side stick controller.  Additional symbology
available on the screen was a copy of the Mode Control Panel information (directly below the side
task), a flap settings dial and various elements associated with landing:  marker lights, gear lights
and GPWS warnings.  When scenarios were run without the EVSD a blank rectangle appeared
where the display was normally located.
Figure 4.2: Simulator Screen Shot
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4.2 AutoFlight System Capabilities
 
Since this experiment explored pilot interaction with the simulator AutoFlight System, this
section enumerates the capabilities that were available on the simulator which were used for this
experimental evaluation.
 
Standard Modes
 
The Advanced Part Task simulator is outfitted with a set of AFS modes designed around the
terminal area operations for which it has historically been used.  In particular, the simulator is
outfitted with the vertical modes shown in Table 4.3.  Since all of the scenarios were run in an
automatic LNAV mode, the lateral modes were not relevant to the experiment.
The simulator is capable of performing changes in altitude in three distinct ways.  The first is
to have a preprogrammed VNAV path to fly which has an altitude change along the path.  The
second is to climb at a “climb” throttle setting, or descend at “idle” thrust setting while
maintaining an airspeed with appropriate pitch to the altitude dialed in the MCP as used in the
 
Table 4.3: Standard Simulator Modes
Mode Name Functionality
 
VNAVPATH Vertical Navigation along a preprogrammed path
FLCH Flight Level Change to the commanded altitude
ALT_HOLD Hold the current commanded altitude
VS Maintain the commanded Vertical Speed
GS Follow the ILS glide slope
GS_ARM Arm for capture of the ILS glide slope
GA Abort the approach and Go Around
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Flight Level Change mode.  The final mechanism is to command a Vertical Speed (V/S).  This
vertical speed could fly away from the altitude dialed into the MCP and cause an open descent or
climb.
In each case, when the path of the aircraft approaches the MCP altitude, a 0.05g capture
maneuver is initiated to smoothly capture the target altitude and automatically transition into an
Altitude Hold mode.  While in this mode, the simulator uses a variation of the 0.05g arc to
maintain the commanded altitude.
The final important mode was the glide slope arming mode, where the AFS was actively
searching for a glide slope signal.  As soon as the glide slope signal became available, the AFS
would engage the Glide Slope (GS) mode.
 
Envelope Protection Modes
 
In order to create scenarios with automatic mode transitions due to overspeed and underspeed
conditions, two envelope protection modes were used.  The first was a High Speed mode, which
protected the aircraft from overspeeding by switching the AFS into a speed on pitch, throttle at
idle setting similar to the Flight Level Change mode explained in Section 2.2.4.  This caused the
descent rate of the aircraft to decrease to the maximum descent rate possible on idle throttle while
not gaining speed.  This mode was only available in modes where the aircraft was not 
 
speed
protected,
 
 i.e. modes in which the speed was allowed to vary in order to capture a specific path or
vertical rate.  In particular, the envelope protection mode was not available or necessary for the
Flight Level Change mode.  This mode had a primary speed target and was not constrained to any
particular path.
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The Low Speed mode was very similar, but switched the aircraft into a speed on pitch, throttle
at Maximum Continuous Thrust (MCT) setting again similar to the Flight Level Change
mode.  The MCT represents the maximum sustainable thrust at altitude.
Finally, a VNAV Speed mode was used to handle situations in which the vertical navigation
logic was incapable of flying the programmed path without deviating from the commanded speed
by more than 10 knots.  This mode placed the aircraft into either a Low Speed or a High Speed
equivalent mode depending on whether the AFS was being asked to climb or descend.
 
Simulator Automation Architecture
 
It was anticipated that the experimental evaluation of the EVSD would have sessions limited
to a few hours per subject.  To enable this evaluation, the AFS architecture was designed to be
explained quickly and clearly to the subject.  Since all of the subjects were expected to have
experience in highly automated, modern cockpits, this task was fairly straightforward.  In order to
create a simple structure, a small set of rules was created and applied to the AFS structure.  The
outcome of this set of rules detailed in Section 4.3 for the subset of the AFS that was modelled for
this experimental evaluation.
4.3 Simulator AutoFlight System Architecture
Designing and implementing a minimal set of rules which defined the AutoFlight System of
the simulator solved a number of difficult situations for which satisfactory answers were not
available in the open literature.  The three rules involved the default state of the aircraft
automation, the hierarchy of the constraints and targets input in various manners, and the actions
of the envelope protection modes after the critical situation had passed.
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4.3.1 Default State
There were two basic default states for the aircraft automation, depending on whether the
VNAV set of modes were engaged.  If VNAV was engaged the AFS would default to VNAV Path,
flying to and on the preprogrammed path as soon as it was capable.  In situations where the
system was forced into VNAV Speed mode, a reversion to VNAV Path would occur as soon as the
aircraft levelled off.  When not in any VNAV mode, and unless otherwise commanded, the
aircraft would remain in its current mode.
4.3.2 Constraint Hierarchy
The overall vertical navigation hierarchy dictated that more immediate modes would override
those that were less immediate, or that inner loop modes would override outer loop modes.  In
particular, anytime the pilot overrode the AutoFlight System and took over manual control, the
rest of the AutoFlight System disconnected itself.  In addition, any time that a preprogrammed
macro mode, VNAV in particular, intersected an inner loop restriction, such as the commanded
MCP altitude or the glide slope, the AFS vertical mode would defer to Altitude Hold mode or
Glide Slope mode, respectively.  
4.3.3 Envelope Protection Modes
Whenever the aircraft AFS was forced into an Envelope Protection mode, it remained in that
mode until it intersected a constraint that would allow it to transition to another mode.  While in
VNAV Speed mode, the aircraft would remain in a descent or climb until it intersected either the
commanded MCP altitude (when it would revert to Altitude Hold mode), or until it intersected a
level section of the programmed path (when it would revert to VNAV Path mode).  When not in
VNAV mode, the aircraft would continue on its flight vector until it intersected the commanded
MCP altitude.
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4.4 Anticipation Capability Implementation
The current implementation of the anticipation capability uses a simplified linear
extrapolation to determine what the aircraft is expected to do.  The linear extrapolation is based
on the current aircraft automation state and operating environment.  
The first segment of the linear extrapolation is created based on the instantaneous flight vector
of the aircraft until it intersects one of the target states (MCP altitude, VNAV path).  Further
extrapolation looks forward to a mode change point caused by either an interception of target state
(reaching the programmed altitude or waypoint, or interception of the glide slope signal) or
anticipates a speed violation based on the acceleration of the aircraft.
Figure 4.4 shows an example of the former type:  the aircraft path line continues straight and
level until it reaches a target - the waypoint labelled TLG.  At that point, it linearly anticipates the
next stage of flight, the descent from TLG to POT.  At POT, the next target point, the altitude
dialed into the Mode Control Panel overrides the VNAV system, and levels the aircraft at
10 000 ft.
Figure 4.4: Anticipation using Programmed Path
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In contrast, Figure 4.5 shows the envelope protection type of anticipation.  The speed of the
aircraft is dropping as it is forced into an unusually steep climb at a high altitude.  This leads to
the AutoFlight System anticipating a envelope protection transition into the Low Speed mode
relatively soon.  From that point forward, the well defined Low Speed mode operating
characteristics are used to anticipate the next segment of the aircraft’s flight.
Figure 4.5: Anticipation using Envelope Protection Limits
58
59
Chapter 5
Experimental Design
The performance of AutoFlight System monitoring with a standard set of displays was
compared to the performance when standard displays were augmented with the Electronic
Vertical Situation Display by performing an experiment using the Aeronautical Systems
Laboratory’s (ASL) Part Task Simulator.  This chapter described the experiment design and the
data analysis used in this study.  Both performance and subjective measures were used in the
evaluation process.  The experimental overview is presented followed by the procedural protocol
and the performance measures.
5.1 Experiment Overview
The overall approach to this experiment was to have subject (current “glass cockpit” airline)
pilots act as Pilot Not Flying (PNF) and observe a set of scenarios running on the ASL Part Task
Simulator.  While subjects observed the scenarios, the researcher acted as Pilot Flying (PF),
interacting with the simulated aircraft automation and responding to prerecorded Air Traffic
Control directives.  Both the subject and the researcher were located in from of identical displays
(shown in Figure 4.2) to simulate the set of instruments available to the captain (subject) and first
officer (researcher) in an actual cockpit.  Both displays were electronically slaved together to
show identical information at all phases of the experiment.  If during the course of the scenario
the subject felt that some sort of mode event (as detailed in Section 5.3.1) occurred, they pressed a
button on the side stick controller and articulated their concern.  This audio data was later
analyzed for timing and content.
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During experimental design it was found that simply monitoring the displays was an
unrealistic representation of the workload in actual cockpit operations.  To correct this, subjects
were given an unrelated side task to monitor.  
This evaluation methodology is very similar to the SAGAT situational awareness technique
(Endsley, 1995) with some implementation differences.  In contrast with SAGAT evaluations,
where the subjects actively interact with the simulator, the EVSD evaluation scenarios were
completely passive for the subjects.  The only interaction was for the subjects to articulate
concerns at any point during the evaluation that they felt necessary.
5.2 Test Matrix
The design of the test matrix included only one independent variable:  the availability of the
EVSD.  This led to each scenario being run at least twice, once with and once without the
display.  
In order to prevent pilots from recognizing a scenario the second time they were exposed to it,
two full sets of scenarios were constructed.  At a minimum, scenarios that address the same mode
awareness problem were set in a different geographic airspace with different associated altitudes,
ATC clearances, timing conditions and waypoints.  
In addition, to prevent pilots from expecting every scenario to have a mode error, some
scenarios were created which did not have mode events.  These “placebo” scenarios, which made
up one third of the scenarios, were scattered throughout the experimental run.
To minimize learning effects, subjects were initially trained with the simulator and with the
display.  Half of the subjects were run through the scenarios first with the EVSD, and secondly
without the EVSD.  The other half of the subject were exposed to the scenarios in the reversed
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order.  In addition, to minimize problems with varying the scenario order between runs, half of
the subjects had one set of scenarios first; the second half had the other set first.  As shown in
Table 5.1, the total of eight subject allowed two complete test matrices to be filled.
5.3 Performance Measures
Three separate performance measures were used in this study.  The first was an objective
measure of the time it took subjects to respond to the incident.  Secondly, a questionnaire was
filled out by each subject after each scenario.  Finally, after all the scenarios had been completed,
subjects filled out a summary questionnaire as an overall evaluation of the EVSD.  
5.3.1 Subject Input
During the scenario, the subject had access to a Push to Talk button which signaled the
computer to record their voice as well as the time at which the signal was sent.  Subjects were
instructed to signal the computer at any time they would normally discuss a problem with the
Table 5.1: Test Matrix
Subject Number First Scenario Set EVSD Second Scenario Set EVSD
1 1 Y 2 N
2 2 N 1 Y
3 1 N 2 Y
4 2 Y 1 N
5 1 Y 2 N
6 2 N 1 Y
7 1 N 2 Y
8 2 Y 1 N
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other pilot, or any time they felt it necessary to discuss the operation and performance of the
aircraft.  Pilots were explicitly instructed to signal they computer when they felt that a mode event
occurred as defined as either:
1. An uncommanded mode transition had occurred
2. An error had been made in interfacing with the FMS
3. An unsafe or nonprocedural operation had taken place
At this point, subjects were instructed to articulate the reason that the button was pressed and
explain the situation to the best of their ability.  Subjects were instructed to use the Push to Talk
button as a tool to communicate problems to ATC, or to the PF.  In addition to recording timing
information, this mechanism also recorded the subject’s statements for future analysis.  The
scenario continued during and after the recording, until the scenario was completed.  After the
scenario was completed, the display blanked and the subject answered a series of questions
designed to determine the level of mode and situational awareness.
5.3.2 Objective Measures
The objective measures were based on the elapsed time between the mode event and the pilot
response or, when relevant, the net altitude deviation the aircraft from the intended path.  The
latter indication was used when the altitude deviation of the aircraft was the relevant factor in the
incident.
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5.3.3 Subjective Measures
After each scenario, subjects were asked questions which addressed the cause of the mode
transition, the consequences of the new mode state and the cues used by the subject to determine
that an incorrect automation state was reached.
1. Why did you stop the scenario? 
2. What caused the event? Why did it happen?
3. What cues did you use to determine that the event occurred?
4. What would have eventually happened if you had not stopped the scenario?
These questionnaires were then rated to determine the level of the subject’s understanding of
the problem.  Each rating corresponded with differing levels of comprehension:
1. Did not react to or understand mode event
2. Reacted procedurally to mode event
3. Understood mode event
In order to determine in a objective manner whether pilots understood the underlying cause of
the incident, each scenario had a key element that was deemed to be indicative of
understanding.  These elements are detailed in Section 6.2 along with the scenarios themselves.
5.3.4 Post Experiment Questionnaire
In addition, after the experiment was completed, subjects filled out a survey comparing the
EVSD enhanced AutoFlight system to the regular AutoFlight System.  An example of this survey
is shown in Appendix A.
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5.4 Subject Selection and Training
Subject were local pilot volunteers who had experience flying highly automated glass cockpit
aircraft, in particular the Boeing B757/B767.  Since subjects were volunteering time to the
experiment and were a self-selected group, results may be skewed in the favour of pilots who are
interested in new technology in the cockpit.
To train subjects, they were first given an overview of the basic instrumentation on the
simulator, including the map display (EHSI), the primary flight display, and the B737 Mode
Control Panel.  Subjects were also trained to the specifics of the AutoFlight System simulated on
the computer.  These specifics included the inclusion of envelope protection and the VNAV Path
to VNAV Speed mode change if the aircraft varied more than 10 kts from the target speed in
VNAV mode.
Since the simulator is not aircraft specific, subjects were allowed to familiarize themselves
with the mixed display conventions.  They were also shown how to use the control stick to
interact with the side task, and how and when to use the Push to Talk button to record mode
events.  In addition, subjects were given a complete demonstration of the capabilities and display
conventions of the EVSD in detail, to allow familiarization.  Subjects were then flown through a
set of three training scenarios.
Before each scenario, subjects were briefed on the state of the aircraft and automation.  An
example of this briefing would be:  “The aircraft is straight and level at FL210, and is waiting on
a climb directive from ATC to FL 350.  We’re in LNAV, and Altitude Hold.  Airspeed is 300 kts
and the next active waypoint is LUX”.  Subjects had the opportunity to ask for clarification of the
aircraft state at any time before the scenario began.  Appropriate diagrams were available for
those scenarios in which landing plates were used.
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Once the scenario began, subjects were instructed to always use the Push to Talk button to
interact with the researcher (Pilot Flying), or with ATC to assure that any conversations were
recorded for later analysis.  The researcher acted as the sole PF and responded to the prerecorded
Air Traffic Control cues that occurred at various times during the scenarios.  The PF also handled
all of the interaction with the MCP and scaled the displays to ensure that the relevant information
was always available.
5.4.1 Side Task
In order to maintain a level of pilot workload, subjects are also given a side task.  The side
stick controller is used to provide input to an indicator bar as it varies based on a Markov
turbulence model.  This side task is located on the top left corner of Figure 4.2.  The goal was to
keep the grey bar centered within the green level lines.
The intent of the sidetask was to increase the workload of the pilot to a more realistic level by
requiring them to break their regular scan pattern in order to deal with the varying indicator
bar.  Subjects were instructed to attend to the side task when they felt they had time, but not at the
expense of monitoring the aircraft.  
5.5 Scenario Design
In order to evaluate the effect of the prototype EVSD on mode awareness a representative
series of experimental scenarios were developed based on a sampling of common mode
awareness problems that were found in the ASRS review and in the open literature.  The
scenarios are described in Chapter 6 along with the results of the evaluation.
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Chapter 6
Scenario Descriptions and Evaluation Results
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate the relative differences in pilot performance
when an Electronic Vertical Situation Display augmented a standard glass cockpit and when such
as display was not available, in terms of both performance and subjective evaluations.  This
chapter reports the results of the experiment:  profiles of the subjects, results of individual
scenarios, and finally the overall subjective evaluation of the display.
6.1 Profile of Subjects
A total of eight subjects participated in this experimental evaluation.  The subject ranged in
ages from 39 to 53 with a mean age of 47.  First officers comprised 62.5% of the subjects; the
remaining 37.5% were captains.  37.5% were initially trained as civil pilots, while the remainder
were initially trained by the military.
Subjects had between 4000 and 15870 hours of civilian flight experience with a mean of 8646
hours.  Between 200 and 5000 of these hours were in glass cockpits, with a mean of 2263
hours.  Estimated flight hours in 1995 ranged between 250 and 800 with a mean of 533 hours.
6.2 Scenario Descriptions and Results
The bulk of the scenarios have results based on objective timing information.  Two of the
scenarios (Target Error by Pilot Flying during Non-precision Approach and the Altitude Capture
Failure during Altitude Change) use the net altitude deviation as a more relevant measure, as it is
of greater merit.  In this context, negative altitude deviations refer to pilots reporting the incident
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before they reached the point at which an altitude deviation would occur.  Similarly, negative
times refer to pilots anticipating the incident and reporting it before it would occur, with the
absolute value of the time indicating the anticipation time.
6.2.1 Glide Slope Transmitter Failure during Approach
This scenario simulated the loss of the ground based glide slope transmitter during an AFS
flown Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach.
Figure 6.1: Glide Slope Transmitter Failure during Approach
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Description
As shown in the first frame of Figure 6.1, the aircraft starts this scenario close to the airport, at
a low altitude, and with flaps in a semi-extended setting (15° ).  In the second frame, the Pilot
Flying engages both the Glide Slope Capture and the Localizer Capture logic in the AFS.  A few
seconds after the glide slope is captured in the third frame, the ground based transmitter
fails.  This failure results in a loss of signal to the aircraft system, causing a mode reversion to
Vertical Speed mode with the current (instantaneous) vertical speed as the target criterium as seen
in the final frame.
This mode reversion is common in AFS designs because it maintains the instantaneous speed
to allow easy recapture of the glide slope in situations where the signal is momentarily interrupted
due to ground reflections or shadowing by other aircraft.  The cues that normally show that the
aircraft’s receiver has failed (crosses over the glide slope information areas on the PFD) are not
shown, because the aircraft based equipment continues to function normally.  After the aircraft
transitions into Vertical Speed mode and the flight path trajectory intersects the ground short of
the runway threshold.  
Mode Event Cues
EVSD-specific cues include a change in the mode header and the green path prediction line
indicating the dangerous flight path as shown in the final frame of Figure 6.1.  
Without the EVSD, cues include the disappearance of the magenta diamond on the glide slope
indicator, and the FMA and the MCP reverting to a vertical speed mode.  In the first frame of
Figure 6.2, the PFD is shown just before the glide slope signal is lost.  In the second frame, the
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loss of signal is shown by the lack of a magenta glide slope tracking diamond on the scale to the
left of the Attitude Determination Indicator (ADI), and by the change in the active mode of the
aircraft from G/S to V/S.
The key element to understanding this scenario was for the subjects to realize that an
equipment failure occurred and that the glide slope signal had been lost and that the new flight
path landed short of the runway.
Results
Figure 6.3 shows that by using the EVSD, subjects noticed and reacted to this mode event
17.2 seconds sooner than without at a confidence level of 80%.  This is interesting in that the only
changes on the EVSD during this scenario are the shift in the green line and the flashing and
alteration of the text displayed in the mode header.
Figure 6.2: Glide Slope Transmitter Failure during Approach:  Non-EVSD Cues
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Pilot understanding of the scenario was slightly different with the EVSD as seen in
Figure 6.4.  One subject recognized the reversion to a Vertical Speed mode, but completely failed
to notice the event in terms of landing short of the runway.  While the subject called for a Go
Around due to loss of glide slope, he failed to realize the immediate implications of the mode
event.
Figure 6.3: Glide Slope Transmitter Failure during Approach:  Timing Results
Figure 6.4: Glide Slope Transmitter Failure during Approach:  Subject Understanding Ratings
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6.2.2 Overspeed Envelope Protection during Altitude Change
A late ATC directive leads to a high vertical descent rate, which engages the envelope
protection of the aircraft.
Description
The first frame in Figure 6.5 shows the aircraft beginning the scenario at a high altitude and at
reasonable speed.  The subject is instructed that they are waiting for an ATC clearance to descend
to the next waypoint.  When the clearance is finally given, it is an urgent request (“ASL123,
Figure 6.5: Overspeed Envelope Protection during Altitude Change
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immediate descent to 17 000 ft.”).  After initially trying a Flight Level Change mode descent, it
becomes clear that a high speed Vertical Speed mode descent will be necessary as shown in the
second frame.
During this steep descent in vertical speed mode, the envelope protection limits of the aircraft
are surpassed.  The aircraft transitions to High Speed Protect mode in the third frame; AFS
control allocation shifts from speed-on-thrust to speed-on-pitch to prevent the aircraft from
overspeeding further.  Finally, due to insufficient descent rate, the aircraft overflies the altitude
crossing as seen in the final frame.
Mode Event Cues
EVSD-specific cues include a mode header change and the green Aircraft Path line indicating
an altered flight trajectory as apparent in the second and third frames of Figure 6.5.  The second
frame in Figure 6.5 shows how the EVSD predicted this mode change before it occurred,
allowing the pilot to anticipate the change long before it is expected to occur.  As shown in the
first Figure 6.6, without the EVSD, the cues include the speed of the aircraft approaching the
limits at which envelope protection will be engaged.  The indication that the crossing restriction
will not be achieved is the Altitude Capture Arc on the EHSI, as shown in the second frame.
The key element to understanding this scenario was for the subjects to realize that the aircraft
was not capable of meeting both the speed and vertical descent rate targets, or that the aircraft had
not been given enough time to make such an altitude change, as well as the fact that the crossing
restriction would not be met.
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Results
Figure 6.7 shows that the anticipation capabilities of the EVSD allowed pilots to predict the
overspeed situation 40.3 seconds sooner than they did without the display, at a confidence level of
95%.  Note that negative times refer to the pilots anticipating the incident.  It was clear during this
experiment that the anticipation capability was directly responsible for the improvement as
subject directly referenced the EVSD when calling ATC to report that they would be unable to
make the crossing.  Several subjects commented on the fact that the information was easily
available in the graphical format.  In addition, several subjects mentioned additional quantitative
Figure 6.6: Overspeed Envelope Protection during Altitude Change:  Non-EVSD Cues
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information available on the display, such as the distance to the overspeed condition, the altitude
at which the overspeed would occur, and the distance by which the altitude restriction would not
be met. 
Figure 6.8 shows the ratings of pilot understanding.  There was a very slight improvement in
favour of the EVSD, as one subject did not notice the implications of the mode event to the larger
flight plan, namely being high at the next waypoint.
Figure 6.7: Overspeed Envelope Protection during Altitude Change: Timing Results
Figure 6.8: Overspeed Envelope Protection during Altitude Change:  Subject Understanding 
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6.2.3 Altitude Capture Failure during Altitude Change
During a Flight Level Change Descent, the aircraft fails to level-off at the MCP altitude.
Description
Figure 6.9, frame one shows the aircraft at the start of the scenario at a high altitude and at
reasonable speed.  The subject is instructed that they are waiting for an ATC clearance to descend
to the next waypoint, seen to be MLT.  When the clearance is given the Pilot Flying initiates a
Flight Level Change mode descent as seen in the second frame.  Upon nearing the altitude
Figure 6.9: Altitude Capture Failure during Altitude Change 
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programmed into the MCP, the Pilot Flying decides to shallow the descent to “smooth out the ride
in the back” by changing the descent into Vertical Speed mode and dialing in a shallower descent,
rate as seen in the third frame, to minimize the transition at the commanded level off altitude.
Instead of capturing the programmed altitude, the aircraft, the aircraft continues its descent at
the commanded vertical speed target as seen in the final frame.  Since the MCP altitude is now
above the aircraft, the vehicle enters an open descent.
Mode Event Cues
The final frame in Figure 6.9 shows the EVSD-specific cue after the event:  the green path
prediction line indicating the open descent.  Without the EVSD, subjects had to monitor the
altitude tape and verify that level off did not occur.  As seen in Figure 6.6, the altitude tape clearly
indicated the aircraft descending through the altitude of 11 000 ft dialed into the MCP.
Figure 6.10: Altitude Capture Failure during Altitude Change:  Non-EVSD Cues
78
The key element to understanding this scenario was for the subjects to realize that an
equipment failure occurred and that the aircraft was placed into an open descent situation which
could lead to Controlled Flight Into Terrain.
Results
As seen in Figure 6.11, subjects were observed to deviate from the target altitude by 45.8 feet
less with the EVSD than without, but this value had little statistical significance.  In this scenario,
the EVSD did not appear to help or hinder this type of inner loop monitoring in a significant
manner.  It was observed that subjects tended to watch the altitude tape on the Primary Flight
Display rather than the EVSD.
This seems to imply that the EVSD may not be useful in situations where the information
necessary to detect a mode event is explicitly available on a standard piece of cockpit
automation.  Alternately, the fact that pilot are trained to use specific display when dealing with
high importance tasks which have dedicated feedback mechanisms may have overridden any use
of the EVSD.  Note that due to an anomaly in the simulation, one of the subjects was not tested in
this particular scenario.
Figure 6.11: Altitude Capture Failure during Altitude Change:  Altitude Deviation Results
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The ratings of pilot understanding were again very similar.  However, as seen in Figure 6.12,
without the EVSD, fewer pilots recognized the full implications of the “altitude bust”.
Figure 6.12: Altitude Capture Failure during Altitude Change:  Subject Understanding Ratings
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6.2.4 VNAV Path to VNAV Speed Transition due to High Winds
During a VNAV flight profile, unanticipated wind conditions cause the aircraft to switch to an
envelope protection VNAV SPD mode in order to prevent the aircraft from varying too far from
the speed target.
Description
As seen in the first frame of Figure 6.13, the aircraft begins the scenario at a high altitude and
at a reasonable speed.  The aircraft is in VNAV mode to meet the altitude restrictions imposed by
the procedure.  All of the restrictions are already programmed into the flight computer.  Soon after
reaching the Top of Descent point and starting the descent, unanticipated tail wind conditions
Figure 6.13: VNAV Path to VNAV Speed Transition due to High Winds 
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result in a higher vertical speed than planned.  This causes the aircraft to fly off of the
programmed path and the speed to increase while the AFS attempts to recapture the path as seen
in the second frame.  The AFS is designed to switch to VNAV Speed mode that when the speed in
VNAV Path mode reaches the critical value of commanded speed – 10 kts which has just occurred
in the third frame.  In VNAV Speed mode, the vertical path is sacrificed to maintain the speed
target.  As seen in the final frame, diverging from the programmed path causes the aircraft to
overfly the next altitude restriction.
Mode Event Cues
The second and third frame of Figure 6.13 show the EVSD-specific cues of a mode header
change, green path prediction line indicating change of descent trajectory and the point of MCP
altitude intercept moves downstream of the next waypoint.
Figure 6.14: VNAV Path to VNAV Speed Transition due to High Winds:  Non-EVSD Cues
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Without the EVSD, the cues include the mode change being indicated in the Flight Mode
Annunciator as seen in the first frame Figure 6.14 and the altitude tape on the PFD can be seen
climbing towards the 10 knot threshold, though the transition point is not noted on the tape.  In
addition the second frame shows that the green Altitude Capture Arc on the EHSI shows the
intersection with the programmed altitude occurring too late.
The key element to understanding this scenario was for the subjects to notice that the speed of
the aircraft was increasing because of the wind conditions.
Results
Figure 6.15 shows that subjects reacted to this mode change 4.7 seconds faster with the EVSD
than without.  However, this value is not statistically significant with the small number of subjects
tested.  This result was unexpected since the same anticipation capabilities that were used
effectively in two other scenarios were available to the subjects.  In fact, only one pilot appeared
(Subject 7) to use the anticipation capabilities by directly referencing the EVSD when calling
ATC to report that the aircraft would be unable to make the crossing.  It is hypothesized that a
Figure 6.15: VNAV Path to VNAV Speed Transition due to High Winds:  Timing Results
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lack of experience with the VNAV system may have been a contributing factor.  Note that due to a
simulator anomaly, the timing results for subject 4 were rendered invalid and so were not included
in the analysis.
Figure 6.16 shows that the pilot understanding ratings did not show any difference whether or
not the EVSD was available.  None of the pilots remarked on the increasing winds during the
descent.
Figure 6.16: VNAV Path to VNAV Speed Transition due to High Winds:  Subject 
Understanding Ratings
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6.2.5 Target Error by Pilot Flying during Non-Precision Approach
In this scenario, the Pilot Flying misdials the MCP altitude and misses an intermediate
waypoint.
Description
The first frame in Figure 6.17 shows the aircraft starting this scenario close to the airport, at a
low altitude, and with flaps fully retracted.  During the non-precision approach, the researcher
acting as Pilot Flying deals with slowing the aircraft by dialing the correct speed targets, and
guiding the aircraft through each altitude restriction.  The second frame shows that during one
Figure 6.17: Target Error by Pilot Flying during Non-Precision Approach 
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such descent, an intermediate altitude target between the Final Approach Fix and the Missed
Approach Point is inadvertently omitted by the Pilot Flying (researcher) causing an altitude
deviation as seen in detail in the final two frames.
Mode Event Cues
The last two frames of Figure 6.17 show the EVSD-specific cues of an inappropriate altitude
target in mode header and the green path prediction line below the solid magenta programmed
path, indicating the neglected intermediate step.  In addition, as the MCP altitude is dialed into the
AFS, the dashed magenta line depicting the commanded level off altitude is seen to be below the
programmed path.  
Without the EVSD, subjects relied on the altitude target box in the Primary Flight Display
above the altitude tape as shown in the first frame of Figure 6.18 and on reading the value directly
from the Mode Control Panel.  A copy of the MCP output that was available on the screen is
shown in the second frame.  In some cases, subjected were noticed to be observing the Pilot
Flying as the incorrect value was being dialed into the MCP.
The key element to understanding this scenario was for the subjects to realize that the Pilot
Flying had misentered the altitude into the MCP.
Results
Altitude deviation in this scenario was measured by how far below the correct altitude the
aircraft was when the subject recognized that a mistake had been made by the Pilot Flying.  In this
context, a negative number represents that the subject realized the error before an altitude
deviation occurred; a positive number represents an actual altitude deviation.
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As seen in Figure 6.19, using the EVSD, subjects were found to deviate from the target
altitude by 117.1 feet more than without, but this value has little statistical significance in light of
the sample size.  It was also observed that subjects watched the Pilot Flying dial the incorrect
value in the MCP rather than observing the mistake elsewhere.  One pilot commented on the fact
that the EVSD was not the correct display to use to catch this error, and that good Cockpit
Resource Management should prevent this type of mistake from occurring.
Figure 6.18: Target Error by Pilot Flying during Non-Precision Approach:  Non-EVSD Cues
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Without the EVSD, Figure 6.20 shows that one subject completely missed the altitude
deviation.  This subject flew at the lower altitude during that entire flight segment.
Figure 6.19: Target Error by Pilot Flying during Non-Precision Approach:  Altitude Deviation 
Results
Figure 6.20: Target Error by Pilot Flying during Non-Precision Approach:  Subject 
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6.2.6 Underspeed during Altitude Change due to ATC Directive
Overconstraining ATC directives cause the aircraft to lose speed to the point where the low
speed envelope protection functionality of the aircraft is engaged.
Description
The first frame in Figure 6.21 shows the aircraft starting the scenario at a high altitude and at a
low speed.  The subject has been instructed that they are waiting for an ATC clearance to climb to
the next waypoint (in this case HUL).  ATC issues a climb crossing restriction, and the Pilot
Flying engages Flight Level Change mode to make the crossing, as seen in the second frame.  A
few minutes later an amendment is issued which asks that a vertical speed target be maintained
Figure 6.21: Underspeed during Altitude Change due to ATC Directive 
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through 35 000 ft.  After switching the aircraft into Vertical Speed mode, and dialing in the target
speed, it becomes clear that the amendment results in a target that exceeds the climb performance
capability of the aircraft, as shown by the segmented flight path in the third frame.  The final
frame shows that some time later, the aircraft envelope protection system engages and transitions
to a Low Speed envelope protection mode.  The lower climb rate in the envelope protection mode
prevents the aircraft from making its crossing restriction, and from maintaining the vertical speed
target.
Mode Event Cues
The final two frames of Figure 6.21 show EVSD-specific cues of the mode header change and
the green path prediction line indicating that the aircraft will not make the restriction.  Without the
EVSD, the subjects had to watch the decreasing speed and the encroaching speed limits on the
speed tape as shown in the first frame of Figure 6.18.  In addition, as shown in the second frame,
the Altitude Capture Arc provided information as to where the aircraft would level off.
Figure 6.22: Underspeed during Altitude Change due to ATC Directive:  Non-EVSD Cues
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The key element to understanding this scenario was for the subjects to realize that the aircraft
was not capable of meeting both the speed and vertical ascent rate targets.  The aircraft had not
been given enough time to make such an altitude change and therefore the crossing restriction
would not be met.
Results
Figure 6.23 shows that the anticipation functionality of the EVSD allowed pilots to predict the
underspeed situation 60.6 seconds sooner with the EVSD than without, at a confidence level of
95%.  Note here that negative times refer to the pilots anticipating the incident before it actually
occurs.  In addition to catching the error, several subjects recorded the distance by which the
crossing restriction would be missed and additional related information (i.e. the altitude at which
the envelope protection mode would be engaged, the location at which the low speed mode would
be engaged, etc.).
Figure 6.23: Underspeed during Altitude Change due to ATC Directive:  Timing Results
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The pilot understanding ratings for this scenario were very clearly skewed in favour of
EVSD.  The clear trend from Figure 6.24 was that the subjects better understood the implications
of the mode event and the cause of the event when they had access to the EVSD display.  It
appears that the anticipatory capabilities of this display are seen to be particularly useful in
situations where the pilot would have to do mental computations to determine where an envelope
protection mode would be engaged.
Figure 6.24: Underspeed during Altitude Change due to ATC Directive:  Subject 
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6.2.7 Unexpected Climb during Approach due to Flap Overspeed
In this scenario, the aircraft attempts to climb to the Missed Approach Altitude due to a flap
overspeed condition caused by Pilot Flying error.
Description
The first frame of Figure 6.25 shows that he aircraft starts this scenario close to the airport, at
low altitude, and with flaps in a semi-extended setting (15° ).  After capturing the glide slope and
localizer (in the third frame) the Pilot Flying reduces the commanded airspeed and dials the
Missed Approach Altitude into the Mode Control Panel.  While lowering the flaps a few seconds
too early, the PF engages the High Speed mode of the AFS.  As seen in the final frame, since the
Figure 6.25: Unexpected Climb during Approach due to Flap Overspeed 
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MCP is dialed to the Missed Approach Altitude (above the current altitude), the aircraft adds
suddenly pitches up and adds power in an attempt to capture the higher altitude.  This particular
problem emulates an event that occurred on an A310 in Orly, France in September 1994.
Mode Event Cues
As seen in the final frame of Figure 6.25, when the envelope protection mode becomes
engaged the pitch-up of the aircraft is readily apparent on the EVSD.  In addition, the acquisition
of the MCP altitude is clearly shown.  Even without the EVSD, the speeds limits are readily
apparent on the Primary Flight Display at all times during the approach as seen in the first frame
of Figure 6.26.  After the flap speed has been exceeded, the PFD also shows the pitch up of the
aircraft (on the ADI) and the engagement of the High Speed mode on the FMA as seen in of the
final frame of Figure 6.26.  The target altitude is available on both the MCP, in the box on the on
the altitude tape of the PFD as the magenta numbering above the tape.
Figure 6.26: Unexpected Climb during Approach due to Flap Overspeed:  Non-EVSD Cues
94
The key element to understanding this scenario was for the subjects to realize that the aircraft
transitioned into the High Speed mode because of the overspeed condition and was flying to the
Missed Approach Altitude.
Results
Figure 6.27 shows that the subjects reacted to the sudden climb 0.8 seconds slower with the
EVSD than without, but the confidence level of this value is low.  This value is also within the
noise level of human reaction time.  In this scenario subjects responded by viewing the pitch up of
the aircraft in the PFD and immediately calling in a go-around condition to ATC.  Once this was
completed, subjects considered what caused the situation and examined the EVSD when it was
available.
The pilot understanding ratings for this scenario were very clearly skewed in favour of
EVSD.  The clear trend from Figure 6.28 was that the subjects better understood the implications
of the mode event, and the elements that cause the event, when they had access to the EVSD
Figure 6.27: Unexpected Climb during Approach due to Flap Overspeed:  Timing Results
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display.  In particular, the fact that the aircraft had been inadvertently programmed to level off at
the Missed Approach Altitude was noted by subjects when the EVSD was available.  Finally,
several subjects felt that the response of the aircraft to this rather minimal overspeed condition
was unwarranted.
Figure 6.28: Unexpected Climb during Approach due to Flap Overspeed:  Subject 
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6.3 Amalgamated Subject Understanding Ratings
Individual scenarios showed statistically minor differences in the subjects understanding of
individual mode events.  However, looking at the amalgamated results shown in Figure 6.29,
there is a clear improvement in mode event understanding when the EVSD is available.  A
Willcoxon analysis to look at the statistical difference between the scenarios which had the EVSD
and those which did not showed a difference at the 90% confidence level.  
Note that a Willcoxon analysis does not measure the actual direction of the
difference.  However, it is clear from the data that the EVSD provided a difference that can be
readily characterized as an improvement.
Figure 6.29: Amalgamated Pilot Understanding Histogram
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6.4 Subjective Results
In addition to the scenario specific results, each subject was asked to fill out a survey to assess
the usefulness of the EVSD in various situations and to determine the usefulness of specific
elements of the EVSD.
6.4.1 Subjective Value of the EVSD
Subjects were asked to rate the value of the EVSD on a scale from Very Valuable to Very
Detrimental.  The results of this questionnaire are shown in Figure 6.30.
As can be seen, all of the subjects felt that the display was at least somewhat valuable.  It
should be noted that the subjects were volunteers for this experiment, so that these results may be
biased by having subjects which were predisposed to new technology in the cockpit.
Figure 6.30: Subjective Questionnaire:  How Valuable was the EVSD
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6.4.2 Comparison of EVSD with Current AutoFlight System
Subjects were also asked to compare the EVSD to the current AFS for a variety of tasks on a
scale from Significantly Better to Significantly Worse as shown in Figure 6.31.
These results show that the subjects found the EVSD useful in a wide range of tasks, from
inner loop target monitoring to augmenting overall situation awareness.  This is not consistent
with the objective results, which seem to point to more effective usage in situations where there
was a strategic advantage to the information on the EVSD.  The display tended to be less useful in
instances where another instrument provided the same information, especially when the task
involved tactical types of inner loop monitoring.
Figure 6.31: Subjective Questionnaire:  Comparison between the EVSD and Current Vertical 
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6.4.3 Subjective Value of Elements of EVSD
Finally, subjects were asked to rate the usefulness of specific elements of the EVSD on a scale
from Very Valuable to Very Detrimental.  Each of these were scales with five levels, with the
middle value being neutral.  In addition, subjects were asked additional comments on the EVSD
and features they felt were missing or required.  The results of this questionnaire are outlined on
Figure 6.32.  Once again, for each question, the percentage of subjects responding in that category
is shown.
Figure 6.32 shows that subjects were not concerned with the control allocation, or the
redundant target state information provided in the top bar of the EVSD.  The interaction of the
Green (Aircraft Path) Line, the VNAV Path information and the graphical target states were cited
as being even more useful than the individual elements.
Figure 6.32: Subjective Questionnaire:  Value of Specific EVSD Elements 
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Subjects were also given the opportunity to comment on features that they felt were missing
on the prototype EVSD.  75% of the subjects were interested in seeing terrain information on the
display and another 25% were interested in seeing vertical weather information.  It should be
noted that terrain information drawn from a database has been incorporated into the current
EVSD design (as seen in Figure 3.2), but the feature was not considered mature and stable enough
to incorporate into this experimental evaluation.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Automation mode awareness problems have been reported by operators of many air transport
aircraft.  An examination of current generation AutoFlight Systems and a review of the ASRS
database highlighted a lack of feedback in the vertical channel of aircraft automation.  It was
hypothesized that many of the incidents involving mode awareness problems could be mitigated
by increased feedback in the vertical channel through an Electronic Vertical Situation Display.
An EVSD was prototyped which had four major display features:  the current mode,
anticipated modes, transitions into anticipated modes, and the consequences of the current state of
aircraft automation.  To evaluate the utility of the display, an experimental set of test scenarios
was developed based on a representative set of known mode awareness problems from the ASRS
review.   Commercial airline pilots with glass cockpit experience were used as subjects in the
experimental evaluation of the EVSD.
The Electronic Vertical Situation Display was found to significantly improve mode awareness
understanding and the detection of mode awareness problems in both subjective and objective
measures of subject response.  Objective results were particularly strong when the anticipation
functions of the EVSD could be used to foresee an event before it actually
occurred.  Amalgamated ratings of pilot understanding of mode awareness problems over the full
set of scenarios increased in a statistically significant manner when the EVSD was available.  In
addition, subjects were much more specific when reporting problems to Air Traffic Control.  For
example, rather than simply reporting that they were unable to make a crossing restriction,
102
subjects would also report how far past of the waypoint the altitude would be acquired.  Several
subjects also mentioned the additional utility of having a vertical image of the aircraft’s
programmed flight.
The subjective survey results showed all of the subjects finding the display at least Somewhat
Valuable.  Display elements of the EVSD were also rated individually, with no elements being
rated as detrimental and certain elements, such as the Aircraft Path Line and the vertical depiction
of the VNAV trajectory being rated as Very Valuable by at least half the subjects.  When subjects
were asked to compare the EVSD with the mode feedback available in the cockpit available, they
felt that overall situational awareness was improved, as was altitude monitoring and envelope
protection monitoring.
Based on the positive results of this preliminary study, further evaluation of the EVSD
concept appears warranted.  Several issues remain to be addressed before a vertical display can be
incorporated into current glass cockpits.  For example an EVSD implementation must be
designed to be compatible with specific AutoFlight Systems.  Specific mode symbologies and
names, scaling concerns, and colour conventions must be addressed, along with issues of
retrofitting this display to current aircraft.  This also entails finding an appropriate location for the
EVSD in the valuable real estate of the modern cockpit.
In addition to continuing the development of the EVSD, other mechanisms to address mode
awareness problems also should be pursued.  In the short term, better training programs,
specifically designed to promote understanding of the AFS should be undertaken to help make
pilots aware of how to avoid and mitigate mode awareness problems.  In the long term, the
underlying structure of the AFS should be evaluated in the pursuit of providing a more consistent
AutoFlight System architecture to pilots.
